A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions.
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Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity?
Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France
A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions, or 'governmental entities that (a) possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials '. i These institutions include courts, central banks, regulatory authorities, quasigovernment agencies and so forth. There are various reasons why governments may decide to delegate their authority in this way. For example, they may want to make a credible commitment in order to pursue certain policy objectives more efficiently. Alternatively, in a context of political uncertainty, they may choose to delegate power and insulate their policies from reforms by political opponents. Equally, they may need to delegate decision making to technical experts in areas of policy complexity.
This article asks the following question: why does the degree of independence vary from one non-majoritarian institution to another? This question is addressed by focusing on the delegation of authority from governments to so-called Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes -AAIs) in France. In order to explore the research 4 question, a number of hypotheses were derived from the existing literature on delegation. These hypotheses centred on motivations relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. Then, an index of independence was constructed and the degree of independence of each AAI was calculated. This served as the dependent variable. In turn, various explanatory variables were identified and a multiple regression was carried out. The results showed that the degree of AAI independence varied as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas. By contrast, the results also showed that the degree of independence was not related to the need to make a credible commitment as a function of the numbers of veto players in the system or as a response to the problem of political uncertainty.
These findings are significant in a number of ways. Firstly, whereas the literature often suggests that the number of veto players and the degree of political uncertainty is instrumental in the decision to delegate, we find that this is not so in the case of AAIs. This casts doubt on the generalizability of such arguments. Secondly, up to now the academic literature has tended to focus on the creation of non-majoritarian institutions and the reasons why they are established in some areas rather than others. In our study, we examine institutions that already exist, but that vary in terms of the degree of independence that has been granted to them. Thus, we suggest that the 5 existing literature can be extended to include studies of existing agencies, rather than simply focusing on the issue of whether or not an act of delegation has taken place.
There are three main parts to the article. The first part briefly outlines the existing literature on delegation and identifies the hypotheses to be tested.
The second part describes the set of AAIs in France and measures the degree of independence that each institution enjoys. The third part tests the hypotheses and presents the findings of the multiple regression model. There is a brief conclusion.
DELEGATION TO NON-MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS
There is an increasingly large body of work on delegation. The earliest studies of this sort focused overwhelmingly on the US and the relationship between Congress and executive agencies. Here, the main issue was whether, by delegating, Congress had abdicated power to such agencies or whether it was still able to control their actions. ii More recently, studies of the US have shifted the emphasis somewhat, focusing on the design of legislation or the choices of political actors at the delegation stage.
iii In a European context, attention has also focused on the issue of government control. Here, the usual assumption is that delegation to non-majoritarian institutions has reduced the decisionmaking capacity of national governments. So, for example, it has been argued 6 that delegation has 'reconfigured the architecture of the state and the EU …' iv and that non-majoritarian institutions 'have become powerful participants in policy making and may now constitute a 'fourth branch of government' in Europe '. v In addition to this work, there is now a growing body of literature that has applied the more recent US work to the European policy-making process. For example, Majone has explored the various logics of delegation, focusing on delegation as a response to the problems of credible commitment and fiduciary relations. vi This article builds on the more recent US and European work. It examines the reasons why political actors delegate different degrees of independence to non-majoritarian institutions. In so doing, it focuses on the strategic choices of actors at the point of delegation, so avoiding the problem of observational equivalence. vii There are various reasons why political actors may decide to delegate decision-making authority to non-majoritarian institutions.
viii
The classic reason is that it helps to establish a credible commitment and solve the problem of time-inconsistency. ix Here, the basic problem is that while it may be rational to do a certain thing at a particular point in time, it may not be rational to do it over time. As Kydland and Prescott put it: "We find that a discretionary policy for which policymakers select the best action, given the current situation, will not typically result in the social objective function being 7 maximised" (1977, pp. 473-74 ).
x Or, as Shepsle states, rather more succinctly:
'Discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally '. xi In the context of non-majoritarian institutions, the literature on credible commitments has taken two main forms. Firstly, there is the argument that the problem of credible commitment affects some policy areas more than others. In particular, it affects sectors that are more internationally interdependent, or that have recently been subject to market opening. So, for example, the desire to establish a credible commitment is the basic motivation behind the decision to create independent central banks. Only by delegating authority to such an institution can governments convince the public that they are serious about wanting to reduce inflation and, thus, reduce the level of inflationary expectations among the public. More generally, it is also the motivation behind the decision to establish Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in areas that have recently been the subject of privatisation or marketopening, such as telecommunications, electricity, transport and so on.
xii From this work, we can construct the following hypothesis:
H1
The degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions will be greater in policy sectors that have been subject to market Table 1 ). In order to proceed with the analysis, the first task was to establish the degree of independence granted to each AAI, or a measure for the dependent variable. To this end, an index of agency independence was constructed. xxvii In order to avoid the problem of observational equivalence, it is important to focus on the instruments of control that exist in law rather than the postdelegation behaviour of the agency in question. Thus, the index is based on the most up-to-date statutes relating to the institution in question. There are two basic elements to the index: indicators relating to the head of the agency and the board of managers; and indicators relating to the powers of the agency.
Firstly, eight indicators were identified relating to the head of the agency and the governing board. These are: the term of office of the head and the agency and the board of managers respectively; the procedure by which they are appointed and dismissed; and whether or not their term of office can be renewed. For each of these indicators, a range of scores from 0 (no independence) to 1 (full independence) was identified. For example, if the president's term of office was less than three years, then a score of 0 was assigned because the turnover would be too great for incumbents to gain any independent decision-making authority; if the term was three years, then the score was 0.2; four years was 0.4; five years was 0.6; six was 0.8; and eight years and over was 1. In terms of appointments, if the head was appointed by a single elected representative, then a score of 0 was assigned; by more than one elected representative, then 0.25; by a complex mix of elected representatives and non-elected actors, 0.5; by one or more non-elected actors, 0.75; and if the appointment was made by the board of the agency itself, then a score of 1 was assigned. In terms of dismissal, if the power to dismiss the head was at the appointer's discretion, then a score of 0 was assigned; no specific provisions for dismissal scored 0.33; dismissal only for reasons not related to policy scored 0.67; and complete security of tenure scored 1. Finally, if the appointment was renewable more than once, then a score of 0 was assigned; no specific provisions scored 0.33; a once-off renewal scored 0.67; and no renewability scored 1. After all the scores had been assigned, the mean of the scores for the head of the agency and the board respectively were calculated. The mean of these means was then calculated. This figure is referred to as 'mean 1 appointments '. xxviii In relation to these calculations, a number of points of clarification need to be made. where a political appointee to one institution is a member ex officio of another institution. Once more, here, a score of 0 was not assigned, but was treated as a complex mix and a score of 0.5 was recorded. By contrast, there were two problematic cases where for the purposes of this study a score of 0 was Moreover, they cannot be dismissed during their term, so both the head and the board members score 1 in this respect as well. On the basis of these scores, the mean for the head is 0.7, the mean for the board is 0.76, and the overall score, the mean 1 appointments, score, is 0.73.
Secondly, five indicators were identified relating to the powers of the AAI in question. These comprized, firstly, the power to give advice, make The overall score for independence was then calculated simply by taking the mean of mean 1 appointments and mean 2 powers. These calculations resulted in a good range of scores for the dependent variable. The most independent institutions were found to be the broadcasting regulator and ART, which both scored 0.87. The least independent institution was the Cinema Ombudsman, which registered 0.17. The score for each institution is reported in Table 2 .
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The third explanatory variable also aims to test the veto-players element of the credible-commitments hypothesis. While the veto-players variable may at first sight seem straightforward, it might be argued that Tsebelis's data constitute an inappropriate measure for veto players in the case of AAIs. This is because these data are designed to capture the general features of political systems, such as the number of political parties, policy distance, the political composition of the coalition and so forth. These data may suit cross-national macro-or meso-level studies very well. However, they may not be so relevant to the study of one set of government agencies in one particular country. Therefore, we decided to identify another variable to test the veto-players element of the credible-commitments hypothesis. To this end, we focused on corporatism. To the extent that all AAIs will be concerned with public policy in one form or another, it seems reasonable to suggest that political actors may have been motivated by extent to which a particular policy area is associated with corporatist-like arrangements. Huber and Shipan have also focused on corporatism as a proxy for veto players. Safety, then this was considered to be a corporatist appointment. This is because the Minister's room for manoeuvre is very small. By contrast, and consistent with the logic of the 'complexity' variable below, when the law states that a person is appointed 'on the advice of' a representative institution, or if such an institution merely 'proposes' the name of an appointee to the Minister, then this was not considered to be a corporatist appointment because the Minister has free rein to ignore any such advice or proposals. The 'corporatism' scores are given in Table 2 below.
The fourth explanatory variable is called the 'political uncertainty' variable. Earlier, it was hypothesized that the degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions will be greater when the level of political uncertainty is high. In their comparative study, Huber and Shipan operationalize political uncertainty by taking the average duration of cabinets on a country-by-country basis. Obviously, this approach is not appropriate in period. For the purposes of this measure, we assumed that there were alternations in power in 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997 and 2002. (The same caveat regarding the above institution applies). Finally, the three measures were standardized and added together. The scores for this indicator are recorded in Table 2 below.
To illustrate how the index works, let us take the example of the The final explanatory variable is called the 'complexity' variable. This variable aims to test the hypothesis that the degree of independence will be greater when the level of policy complexity is high. It is based on the idea that the degree of core executive control will be less extensive in issue areas that are more complex, or technical. Here, the degree of issue complexity is associated with the notion of 'expertise': the greater the issue complexity, the greater the need for policy experts.
The legislative perception of policy complexity can be established by calculating the percentage of people with policy-specific qualifications who sit on the governing council of each AAI. In some cases, such as the National Commission for Information and Civil Liberties, the legislation explicitly states that a number of "qualified" people must be appointed. In this case, the governing council includes two people qualified for their knowledge of the application of information technology. In other cases, such as the Insurance Control Commission, there is mention of the need for people to be chosen "because of their experience" in a certain area, in this case "insurance and financial matters". Thus, any time when mention is made of the need for "competence", "experience", or "qualifications", the appointee is classed as an 'expert'.
In most cases, this logic allows the percentage of experts to be calculated for each AAI very easily. That said, as with the corporatism variable above, one difficult matter needs to be addressed. In some cases, For both reasons, therefore, an appointee is only recorded as an 'expert' when there is an explicit reference made to the need for an appointee to have specific "competences", "experience", or "qualifications" in a particular domain. The 'expertise' scores for all AAIs are provided in Table Two Table Three . Table 3 about here.
These findings raise the question of why the veto players and uncertainty hypotheses fail to make any impact on the independence of AAIs.
In other words, why is it that some elements of the existing literature were found to be robust, whereas others were not. One plausible explanation is that the veto players and uncertainty arguments are only relevant when the AAIs are politically salient. Arguably, politicians are likely to be much more concerned about the numbers of veto players and the level of political uncertainty when the issue in question is directly related to electoral 31 competition. However, when the area is politically insignificant, then these factors are less important. In order to explore this idea, we investigated the coverage that AAIs receive in France's most well-known quality newspapers.
Based on the assumption that the issues, which are important to electoral competition are likely to receive relatively high coverage in the media, we calculated the political salience of the various AAIs.
In the French case, the most tractable media source is the press. This is Unfortunately, in our data this would have made little sense, since we have only two salient cases. Once we had put them in our model, we would have had to take them out again to avoid suggesting that a relationship driven by two cases applies to our sample as a whole.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the motivations of political actors at the point of delegation? In particular, it has examined the issue of why a greater degree of 33 independence is granted to some institutions rather than others. In the existing literature, various explanations, mainly derived from US case studies, have suggested why this may be the case. We tested these explanations in the case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France. We found that the degree of independence is much greater for regulatory as opposed to nonregulatory agencies and that agency independence also increases with the level of the perceived need for expert board members. These findings are significant and for three reasons. Firstly, France is a difficult test case. It is not an 'Anglo-Saxon' democracy. In particular, it has a very different political system from the US. In this context, the fact that various elements of the existing literature were found to be robust is important. The theory has crossed a difficult hurdle. Secondly, AAIs do not comprise a list of classic IRAs. They include a very varied set of institutions. Once again, therefore, the fact that various elements of the existing literature were found to be robust is also important. The literature on delegation can be extended to include a wider set of non-majoritarian institutions than has usually been the case.
Thirdly, even though the veto players and uncertainty explanations were not found to be convincing, this may be a function of the low level of electoral salience associated with many AAIs. In other words, there may be two different theories of delegation: one for politically salient decisions and one for those which are 'under the radar' of electorally-sensitive politicians. We 34 provide some evidence to back up this argument, but it needs to be tested more fully. Therefore, we establish an agenda for future research in this area. Notes: Model is Ordinary Least Squares; *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
